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.ion .
That level which is built into the unit and
therefore inherent in its design. This is the
highest level of reliability and safety that can*
be expected from a unit, system or. Shuttle.
To achieve higher levels of reliability gen-
erally requires modification or redesign.
i Those maintenance items that are judged by
the manufacturer to be relatively the most
i important from a safety or reliability stand-
point, or from an economic standpoint.
Those local areas of primary structure which
are judged by the manufacturer to be relatively
the most important from a fatigue or corrosion
vulnerability standpoint or from a failure
effects standpoint.
The ability to perform the required functions
within acceptable operational standards for
the time period specified.
That maintenance action which will reliably
detect incipient failures if they exist. That
is, detect the pending failure of a unit or
i system before that system fails. For example,
detection of turbine impeller cracks prior to
impeller failure.
Those data about real, operating hardware
that is similar enough to the hardware under
discussion to be applicable to the design of
maintenance programs for the current hardware.
The deterioration of inherent (design) levels
of reliability. As failure resistance reduces,
failures increase; resulting in lower reliability.
If reduction in failure resistance can be detected,
maintenance can be performed prior to the point
where reliability is adversely affected. i
Refers to launch and ferry operations.
. .I
iFunction
Failure Modes
Failure Effects
Potential Effectiveness
Routine Operation Crew Monitoring
BITE
Minimum Equipment. List (MEL)
Is Elapsed Time for Correction of
Failure >0.5 Hr.
/
The characteristic actions of units, systems,
and Shuttle.
The ways in which units, systems and Shuttle
deteriorate and can be considered to have
failed.
* The consequence of failure.
Capable of being effective (maintenance action)
to some degree.
That monitoring that is inherent in normally
;operating the Orbiter. For example, the pre-'
4 flight check list, or the normal operation of
the Orbiter and its components and through
ground monitoring by telemetry systems.
Built in test equipment.
This assumes that there can be equipment not
related to the flight worthiness which could be 
inoperable and still dispatch the Shuttle for
launch or the Orbiter for ferry flight.
The figure of 0.5 hr is an arbitrary number so
that time to correct the failure is a considera-
I tion.
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SECTION I
GENERAL
,1.1 INTRODUCTION
Airline and manufacturer experience in developing scheduled maintenance pro-
grams for new aircraft has shown that morefficient programs can be developed through
the use of logical decision processes. his documen adapt ion of the Airline/
Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning ocument, MSG- provides a syste-
matic tool to develop a maintenance program which will maintain iherent design levels
of operating safety. Principally, the evaluations are based on the system and compo-
nents functions and failures modes.
1.2 OBJECTIVE
It is the objective of this document to present a means for developing a mainte-
nance program which will be acceptable to the Development Centers, the Operators (KSC
and AF), and the Manufacturers. The maintenance program data will be developed by
coordination with specialists from the operators, manufacturers and the development
center. Specifically it is the objective of this document to outline the general organiza-
tion and decision processes for determining the essential scheduled maintenance require-
ments for the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
This document is intended to facilitate the development of initial scheduled
maintenance programs. The remaining maintenance, that is non-scheduled or non-
routine maintenance, is directed by the findings of the scheduled maintenance program
and the normal operation of the Shuttle. The remaining maintenance consists of mainte-
nance actions to correct discrepancies noted during scheduled maintenance tasks, non-
scheduled maintenance, normal operation,,or condition monitoring.
1.3 SCOPE
The scope of this document shall encompass the maintenance program for the
entire Orbiter and where applicable to other program elements.
1.4 ORGANIZATION
The organization to carry out the maintenance program development pertinent to
the Shuttle shall be staffed by representatives of the Operators, the Prime Manufacturers
of the Shuttle, and the. Development Centers.
i . . ..
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1.4.1 The management of the maintenance program development activities shall be
accomplished by a Steering Group composed of members from the KSC, Air Force, MSC,
MSFC and representatives of the Orbiter and Engine Manufacturers. It shall be the
responsibility of this group to establish policy, direct the activities of Working Groups
or other working activity, carry out liaison with the manufacturer and operators, and pre-
pare the final program recommendations.
1.4.2 A number of Working Groups, consisting of specialist representatives from the
Operators, the Prime Manufacturer, and the Development Centers may be constituted.
The Steering Group, alternatively, may arrange some other means for obtaining the
detaijed technical information necessary to develop recommendations for maintenance
programs in each area. Irrespective of the, organization of the working activity, it must
provide written technical data that support its recommendations to the Steering Group.
After approval by the Steering Group these analyses and recommendations shall be con-
solidated into a final report for presentation to the Program Manager.
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SECTION II
DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
2.1 PROGRAM REQUIREMENT
A maintenance program must be developed before the Space Shuttle becomes
operational.
2.1.1 4he primary purpose of this document is to establish an;initial maintenance
program. e purpose of this program is to maintain the inherent*design levels of opera-
ting safety3 This program becomes the basis for the first i sue of Operations Specifi-
cations-Maintenance to govern initial maintenance policy. [ These are subject to revisions:
as operating experience is accumulated. /
2.1.2 It is desirable, therefore, to define in some detail:
(a) The objectives of an efficient maintenance program,
(b) The content of an efficient maintenance program, and
(c) The process by which an efficient maintenance program can be developed.
2.1.3 The Objectives of an efficient maintenance program are:
(a) To prevent deterioration of the inherent design levels of reliability and
operating safety of the Shuttle, and
(b) To accomplish this protection at the minimum practical costs.
2.1.4 These objectives recognize that maintenance programs, as such, cannot correct
deficiencies in the inherent design levels of flight equipment reliability. The maintenance
program can only prevent deterioration of such inherent levels. If the inherent levels are
found to be unsatisfactory, engineering action is necessary to obtain improvement.
2.1.5 The maintenance program itself consists of two types of tasks:
(a) A group of scheduled tasks to be accomplished at specified intervals.
The objective of these tasks is to prevent deterioration of the inherent design levels of
Shuttle reliability, and
(b) A group of non-scheduled tasks which results from:
(1) The scheduled tasks accomplished at specified intervals,
(2) Reports of malfunctions (usually originated by the flight crew), or
(3) Condition Monitoring.
*See Glossary
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The objective of these non-scheduled tasks is to restore the equipment to its
inherent level of reliability
2.1 .5.1 This document describes procedures for developing the scheduled mainte-
nance program. Non-scheduled maintenance results from scheduled tasks, normal opera-..
tion or condition monitoring.
2.1.6 Maintenance programs generally include one or more of the following primary
maintenance processes:
(a) Hard Time Limit: A maximum interval for performing maintenance tasks.
These intervals usually apply to overhaul, but also apply to total life of parts or units.
(b) On Condition: Repetitive inspections, or tests to determine the condi-
tion of units or systems or portions of structure.
(c) Condition Monitoring: For itemsthat have neither hard time limits nor
on condition maintenance as their primary maintenance process. Condition monitoring
is accomplished by appropriate means available to an operator for finding and resolving
problem areas. These means range from notices of unusual problems to special analysis
of unit performance.
2.2 SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE PROGRAM CONTENT'
The tasks in a scheduled maintenance program may include:
(a) Servicing I
(b) Inspection
(c) Testing
(d) Calibration
(c) Replacement
2.2.1 An efficient program is one which schedules only those tasks necessary to meet
the stated objectives. It does not schedule additional tasks which will increase mainte-
nance costs without a corresponding increase in reliability protection.
2.2.2 The development of a scheduled maintenance program requires a very large
number of decisions pertaining to:
(a) Which individual tasks are necessary,
(b) How frequently these tasks should be scheduled, 
(c) What facilities are required to enable these tasks to be accomplished,
(d) Where these facilities should be located, and
(e) Which tasks should be accomplished concurrently In the Interests of economy.
j -2
2.3 SHUTTLE SYSTEM/COMPONENT ANALYSIS METHOD
The method for determining the content of the scheduled maintenance program for
systems and components (parts a and b of Paragraph 2.2.2) uses decision diagrams.
These diagrams are the basis of an evaluatory process applied to each system and its
significant items using technical data provided (Paragraph 2.7). Principally, the eval-
uations are based on the systems' and items' functions and failure modes. The purpose is to:
(a) Identify the systems and their significant items*.
(b). Identify their functions*, failure modes* and failure effects*.
(c) Define scheduled maintenance tasks having potential effectiveness* rela-
tive to the control of operational reliability*.
(d) Assess the desirability of schedul)ng those tasks having potential effec-
tiveness.
2.3.1 It should be noted that there is a difference between "potential" effectiveness
of a task versus the "desirability" of including this task in the scheduled maintenance
program. The approach taken in the following procedure is to plot a path whereby a final
judgment can be made as to whether those potentially effective tasks are worthy of inclu-
sion in an initial maintenance program.
2.3.2 There are 3 decision diagrams provided (Appendix 1, Chart A, Figures 1
through 3). Figure 1 is used to determine scheduled maintenance tasks having potential
effectiveness relative to the control of operational reliability. This determines tasks
which can be done.
Figures 2 and 3 are used to assess the desirability of scheduling those tasks
having potential effectiveness.
(a) -Figure 2 tasks must be done to prevent direct adverse effects on opera-
ting safety and to assure availabi ityof hidden functions.
(b) - Figure 3 tasks should. be i done for economic value:; .i
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The total analysis process is shown diagramatically below. (See Appendix 1
'l
FIGURE 1
(QUESTIONS a,b,c,d,e)
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2.3.4 The following guidelines encourage consideration of failure consequences and
the potential effectiveness of scheduled maintenance tasks. In those cases where failure
consequences are purely economic, the guidelines lead to consideration of both the cost
of the scheduled maintenance and the value of the benefits which will result from the task.
2.3.5 A decision tree diagram (Appendix 1, Chart A) facilitates the definition of
scheduled maintenance tasks having potential effectiveness. There are five key questions.
NOTE: Questions (a), (b), and (c) must be answered for each
failure mode, question (d) for each function, and
question (e) for the item as a whole.
(a) Is reduction in failure resistance* detectable by routine operations crew
monitoring*?
(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by in position maintenance
or test (BITE or GSE)?
(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect upon operating safety?
(See Appendix 2.)
(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the operations crew? (See
Appendix 3.)
(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and reliability?
2.3.6 Each question should be answered in isolation, e.g. in question (c) all tasks
which prevent direct adverse effects on operating safety must be listed. This may result
in the same task being listed for more than one question.
2.3.7 If the answer to question (a) is Yes, this means there are methods available
through monitoring of the normal in-flight instrumentation to detect incipient conditions
before undesirable system effects occur. A Yes answer does not require a maintenance
task. If the answer is No, there is no in-flight monitoring which can detect reduction in
failure resistance. This question is meant to refer to the operations crews' ability to detect
deteriorating calibration or system operation before a failure occurs. NOTE: Tasks
resulting from in-flight monitoring are part of non-scheduled maintenance.
2.3.8 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, it means there is a maintenance task, not
requiring item disassembly, that has potential effectiveness in detecting incipient
conditions* before undesirable system effects occur. Tasks may include inspection, ser-
vicing, testing, etc. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (b) are part
of the On Condition maintenance program. -
*See Glossary
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2.3.9 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, this failure mode has a direct, adverse
effect on operating safety. It is necessary to examine the mechanism of failure and
identify the single cells or simple assemblies where the failure initiates. Specific total
time, total flight cycle, time since overhaul or cycle since overhaul limitations may be
assigned these single cells or simple assemblies and the probability of operational fail-
ures will be minimized. Examples of these actions are turbine engine disc limits,engine
giimbal actuator limits, etc. In many cases, these limits must be based upon manu-
facturer's development testing. Fortunately, there is only a small number of failure modes
which have a direct, adverse effect on operating safety. This results from the fact that
failure mode analyses are conducted throughout the process of flight equipment design.
In most cases, it is possible after identification of such a failure mode to make design
changes (redundancy, incorporation of protective devices, etc.) which eliminate its direct ·
adverse effect upon operating safety. If no potentially effective task exists, then the
deficiency in design must be referred back to the manufacturer. The term "direct adverse
effect upon operating safety" is explained in Appendix 2. NOTE: Tasks resulting from
a Yes answer to question (c) are part of either the Hard Time limitation maintenance pro-
gram, or the On Condition maintenance program.
2.3.10 Refer to Appendix 3 for explanation of question (d). If the answer to question
(d) is Yes, periodic ground test or shop tests may be required if there is no other way of :
ensuring that there is a high probability of the hidden function being available when
required. The frequencies of these tests are associated with failure consequences and
anticipated failure probability. A component cannot be considered to have a hidden func-'
tion if failure of that function results in a system malfunction which is evident to the
flight crew during normal operations. In this case, the answer must be No. NOTE: Tasks
resulting from a Yes answer to question (d) may be part of either the Hard Time limitation
or the On Condition maintenance program.
2.3.11 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, periodic overhaul may be an effective way
of controlling reliability. Whether or nor a fixed overhaul time limit will indeed be effec-
tive can be determined only by actuarial analysis of operating experience. NOTE: Tasks
-resulting from a Yes answer to question (e) are part of the Hard Time limitation maintenance'
program.
2.3.12 It has been found that overall measures of reliability of complex components, 
such as the premature removal rate, usually are not functions of the age of these compo-
nents. In most cases, therefore, the answer to question (e) is No. In this event,
scheduled overhaul cannot improve operating reliability. Engineering action is the only
means of improving reliability. These components'should be operated, therefore, without
scheduled overhaul. 'NOTE,: Systems or items which require 'no. scheduled tasks are
included in Condition Monitoring., ,: "
2-6 . . , ' .
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2.3.13 The preceding paragraph is contrary to the common belief that each component
has an unique requirement for scheduled maintenance in order to protect its inherent level
of reliability. The validity of this belief was first challenged by actuarial ana'lyses of the
life histories of various components. More recently, the correctness of the preceding
paragraph has been overwhelmingly demonstrated by the massive operational experience
of many airlines with many different types of components covered by Reliability Programs
complying with FAA Advisory Circular 120-17.
2.3.14 The questions in Figure 1 are intended to determine maintenance tasks having
potential effectiveness for possible inclusion in a scheduled maintenance program. How-
ever, it is probable that many of these "potentially" beneficial scheduled tasks would
not be "desirable" even though such tasks could improve reliability. This might be true
when operating safety is not affected by failure or the cost of the scheduled maintenance
task is greater than the value of such resulting benefits as reduced incidence of component
premature removal, reduced incidence of departure delays, etc. Additional diagrams are
used to assess the "desirability" of those scheduled maintenance actions which have
potential effectiveness. This is accomplished by Figures 2 and 3, Chart A, Appendix 1.
2.3.15 Figure 2 selects those tasks which must be done because of operating safety
or hidden function considerations. Figure 3 selects those tasks which should be done
because of economic considerations.
2.3.16 Figure 2 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers of questions c and d
in Figure 1, and selects those tasks which must be done.
2.3.17 For the operating safety question, at least one task must be listed for each
failure mode having a Yes answer to question c of Figure 1. An explanation should be
given for any question c tasks not selected.
2.3.18 For the hidden function question, normally at least one task must be listed for
each hidden function having a Yes answer to Figure 1, question d. If a task is not
selected, as permitted by Appendix 3, an explanation must be provided.
2.3.19 Figure 3 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers in Figure 1, questions
b and c and select those tasks which should be done because of economic considerations.
2.3.20 A key question in Figure 3 is the first, "Does real and applicable data* show
desirability of scheduled task?* A "Yes" answer is appropriate if there is:
(a) Prior knowledge from missile and aircraft experience that the scheduled
maintenance tasks had substantial evidence of being truly effective and economically
worthwhile, and
(b) The system/component configurations of previous missile or aircraft and
the Shuttle are sufficiently similar to conclude that the task will be equally effective.
*See Glossary
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2.3.21 The question "Does failure prevent dispatch*" refers to whether the item will
be on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL)*.
2.3.22 The question "Is elapsed time for correction of failure >0.5 Hr.*" refers to
whether corrective action can be accomplished wi th minimum delay.
2.3.23 When a task "requires evaluation" it is important that the frequency of the
failure and the cost of carrying out the task are taken into consideration.
2.4 VEHICLE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS METHOD
The method for determining the content of the scheduled maintenance program for
structure is:
(a) Identify the significant structural items*.
*;'...
(b) Identify their failure modes and failure effects.
(c) Assess the potential effectiveness of scheduled inspections of structure.
(d) Assess the desirability of those inspections of structure which do have
potential effectiveness.
2.4.1 The structure will be treated as hereafter described. This element includes
the structure (fuselage, crew compartments, payload bay doors, bulkheads, thrust struc-
ture, wing, tail, etc.); and thermal protection (panels, panel support, insulation, etc.).
Additionally, the mechanical assemblies of structural components, such as hatches,
emergency exits, and flight control surfaces, landing gear, docking systems, separation/
attachment, etc., will be treated individually by the processes described in Paragraph 2.3.
2.4.2 The decision tree diagram, Chart A, Figure I of Appendix 1, facilitates the
definition of scheduled inspections of structure having potential effectiveness. There are
five key questions.
(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by routine operations crew
monitoring?
(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by in position maintenance
or test (BITE or GSE)?
(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect upon operating safety?
(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the operations crew?
(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and reliability?
*See Glossary
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2.4.3 The answer to question (a) is normally No. However, if in-flight instrumen-
tation is developed which permits detection of incipient structural failures then the ans-
wer could be Yes.
2.4.4 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, there are methods available to detect
incipient conditions before undesirable conditions occur. It would be expected that all
redundant external an-d internal structure would be in this category. NOTE: Tasks
resulting from a Yes answer to question (b) are part of the Structural Inspection program.
This program is an On Condition program.
2.4.5 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, there is a failure mode which has a direct,
adverse effect on operating safety for which there is no effective incipient failure detec-
tion method. It would be expected that non-redundant primary structure would be in this
category. See Appendix 2 for explanation of "direct adverse effect on operating safety."
NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c) are part of the Hard Time limi-
tation (usually total time or total cycle limits) maintenance program.
2.4.6 If the answer to question (d) is Yes, there is a function required of this element
of structure that is not regularly used during normal flight operations. Some inspection or
test is therefore necessary to ensure that this function has a high probability of being ·
available when required. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (d) are
part of the Structural Inspection program.
2.4.7 Structures would be expected to have a Yes answer to question (e) but only in
a very long total time envelope. The tasks performed as a result of Yes answers to the
other questions are capable of detecting deterioration prior to failure of these items.
2.4.8 It is probable that some of these "potentially" beneficial scheduled inspections
would not be desirable, even if such tasks would improve reliability. This might be true
when airworthiness is not affected by failure and the cost of the scheduled inspection is
greater than the value of the resulting benefits. Therefore, additional diagrams are used
to assess the desirability of those scheduled tasks which have potential effectiveness.
This is accomplished by Figures 2, 4 and 5 (Charts A,B,C) of Appendix 1. A No
answer to all questions is unlikely for structure. If it occurs, the item is Included in
Condition Monitoring.
2.4.9 Figure 2 selects those tasks that must be done because of operating safety
or hidden function considerations.
2.4.10 Figures 4 and 5 (Charts B and C) of Appendix 1 establish internal and external
class numbers for structural items. The class numbers take into account vulnerability to
failure, consequences of failure. The class numbers are'to be used as guides for setting
internal and external inspection frequencies.
.,;:!. .. I
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2.4.11 The items to be evaluated by Figures 4 and 5 (Charts B and C) are those
termed "structurally significant."
2.4.12 Each item is first rated for each of five characteristics per Figure 4 (fatigue
resistance, corrosion resistance, crack propagation resistance, degree of redundancy
and fatigue test rating).
2.4.13 Each item is then given an overall rating (R No.) per Figure 4 which considers
all of the above ratings and combines them by judgment into a single overall rating
(R No.) representing a relative level of structural integrity of the item. In general, the
overall R No. for an item is equal to or less than the fatigue resistance or corrosion
resistance rating for the item, whichever is lesser.
2.4.14 The internal and external class numbers for each item are then determined by
reference to Figure 5. Note that some items have both internal and external class num-
bers. This occurs for those internal items which have some probability of the internal
item's condition being evident by some external condition. In these cases the item as
described is visible internally and the "internal" inspection specified refers to the item
as described. The "external" inspection of this item refers to that portion of the external
structure which is adjacent to the internal item and which may yield some indication of
the internal item's condition. Therefore, when an external inspection is specified for an
internal item it refers to the adjacent external structure and not the internal item itself.
2.5 PROPULSION SYSTEM ANALYSIS METHOD
gram is
The method for determining the content of the scheduled engine maintenance pro-:
: !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(a) Identify the systems and their significant items.
(b) Identify their functions, failure modes and failure effects.
(c) Define scheduled maintenance tasks having potential effectiveness relative
to the control of operational reliability.
(d) Assess the desirability of scheduling those tasks having potential effec-
tiveness.
(e) Determine initial sampling thresholds where appropriate.
2.5.1 The propulsion system as a whole and each significant engine item will
treated as described below. ' 
2-10
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2.5.2 The decision tree diagram, Chart A, Figure 1, of Appendix 1, facilitates the
definition of scheduled inspections having potential effectiveness. There are five key
questions.
NOTE: Questions (a), (b), and (c) must be answered for each
failure mode, question (d) for each function, and
question (c) for the item as a whole;.
(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by routine operations crew
monitoring ?
(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by in place maintenance or
test (BITE or GSE)?
(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect upon operating safety?
(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the operations crew?
(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and reliability?
2.5.3 If the answer to question (a) is Yes, there are methods available through moni-
toring the normal in-flight instrumentation (including maintenance recorder) to detect
incipient conditions before undesirable system effects occur. A Yes answer does not
require a maintenance task. If the answer is No, there is no in-flight monitoring which
can detect reduction in failure resistance. NOTE: Tasks resulting from in-flight moni-
toring are part of non-scheduled maintenance.
2.5.4 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, there is a maintenance task, not requiring
engine disassembly, that has potential effectiveness in detecting incipient conditions
before undesirable system effects occur. Tasks may include inspection, servicing,
testing, etc. NOTE: Tasks resulting from Yes answers to question (b) are part of the
On Condition maintenance program.
2.5.5 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, this engine component has a failure mode
with direct, adverse effect on operating safety. It is necessary to examine the mechanism
of failure and identify the single cells or simple assemblies where the failure initiated.
Specific total time, or total flight cycle, limitations may be assigned these components
to minimize the probability of operational failures. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes
answer to question (c) are part of either the Hart Time limitation maintenance program,
or the On Condition maintenance program.
2.5.6 If the answer to question (d) is Yes, there is a function required of this engine
component that is not evident to the operations crew when the component fails. Some scheduled
task may be necessary to assure a reasonably high probability that this function is avail-
able when required. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (d) may be
part of either the Hard Time limitation or the On Condition maintenance program.
2-11
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2.5.7 It is expected that the answer to question (c) is always Yes for structural
engine components), but that their expected life is very long relative to the usual engine
inspection periods. If tasks defined by questions (a) through (d) are inadequate to control
wear or deterioration of engine components, additional tasks should be listed here.
NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c) are part of either the Hard Time
limitation or the On Condition maintenance program.
2.5.8 Engine components for which no scheduled tasks are selected are included in
Condition Monitoring.
2.5.9 The questions in Figure 1 are intended to determine maintenance tasks having
potential effectiveness for possible inclusion in a scheduled maintenance program. How-
ever, it is probable that many of these "potentially" beneficial scheduled tasks would not
be "desirable" even though such tasks could improve reliability. This might be true when
operating safety is not affected by failure or the cost of the scheduled maintenance task
is greater than the value of such resulting benefits as reduced incidence of component
premature removal, reduced incidence of delays, etc. Additional diagrams are
used to assess the "desirability" of those scheduled maintenance actions which have
potential effectiveness. This is accomplished by Figures 2 and 3 (Chart A) of Appendix 1.
2.5.10 Figure 2 selects those tasks which must be done because of operating ·safety or
hidden function considerations. Figure 3 selects those tasks which should be done because
of economic considerations.
2.5.11 Figure 2 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers of questions c and d
in Figure 1, and selects those tasks which must be done.
2.5.12 For the operating safety question, at least one task must be listed for each
failure mode having a Yes answer to question c of Figure 1. An explanation should be
given for any question c tasks not selected.
2.5.13 For the hidden function question, normally at least one task must be listed for
each hidden function having a Yes answer to Figure 1, question d. If a task is not
selected, as permitted by Appendix 3, an explanation must be provided.
2.5.14 Figure 3 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers in Figure l, questions:(b) and (e) and selects those tasks which should be done because of economic considera-
tions.
2.5.15 A key question in Figure 3 is the first, "Does real and applicable data show
desirability of scheduled task?"
' 1 - . , .
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A "Yes" answer is apprpriate if there is: 
(a) Prior knowledge from missile and aircraft experience that the scheduled
maintenance tasks had substantial evidence of being truly effective and economically
worthwhile, and
(b) The system/component configurations of previous missile or aircraft and
the Shuttle are sufficiently similar to conclude that the task will be equally effective.
2.5.16 The question "Does failure prevent dispatch" refers to whether the item will be
on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). The answer to question (b) is expected to always!
be Yes for engine components that cause engine failure.
2.5.17 The question "Is elapsed time for correction of failure >0.5 Hr.*" refers to
whether corrective action can be accomplished with minimum delay.
2.5.18 When a task "requires evaluation" it is important that the frequency of the
failure and the cost of carrying out the task are taken into consideration.
2.5.19 Engine tasks are included in the Threshold Sampling maintenance program.
This program is described below.
2.5.20 The Threshold Sampling maintenance program is intended to recognize the On
Condition design characteristics of modem rocket and turbo-jet engines, while sampling
to control reliability. This program uses repetitive sampling to determine:
(a) The condition of engine components.
(b) The advisability for continued operation to the next sampling limit, and
(c) The next sampling limit, threshold, or sampling band.
2.5.21 Initial sampling thresholds are based on:
(a) The design of the engine under study, the results of developmental
testing, and prior service experience,
(b) The results of previous engine programs,
(c) The fact that samples are available from engines removed for all causes
at virtually all ages. This means that knowledge of the condition of engines is available
over the complete continuum of time from start of operation to the highest time exper-
ienced, and
(d) The fact that most engine design problems become apparent and can be
controlled well within any established, limits or thresholds.
*See Glossary ; .... 2
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2.5.22 The Threshold Sampling program establishes the initial sampling threshold.
Operators are subsequently responsible for:
(a) Evaluating the samples obtained from the initial threshold,
(b) Determining the next sampling threshold, and
(c) Determining the number to be sampled at the next theshold.
2.5.23 Threshold Sampling is normally accomplished by inspecting the parts or sys-
tems of engines that are removed and accessible in the shop. These engines provide
samples over a full range of ages without waiting for the threshold to be reached. The
results of inspecting these samples are used to determine the future program. When
samples are not available from engines that are in the shop, scheduled samples or in
place inspections may be required.
2.6 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
Program Office participation is encouraged as early and as thoroughly as possible
in all phases of working group activity. It is recognized that the program manager will
later be asked to approve the proposed program resulting from these efforts. The following
activity phases will apply.
Phase I. Steering Group general familiarization training.
Phase II. (a) Working Group or Working Activity Training.
#(b) Preparation of first draft Significant Items List (Paragraph 2.7.1).
#(c) Establish functions and failure modes applicable to the
Significant Items.
(d) Preparation of Figures 1 through 5 decision diagram replies
and supporting data for each system and significant item.
Phase III. (a) Evaluation of manufacturer's technical data and recommended
tasks by the Working Groups' operational personnel and meeting
with manufacturer to make necessary revisions and prepare task
recommendations.
(b) Development of task frequency recommendations. (This phase
is meant to follow Phase IIIll. (a);'
NOTE: A Steering Group member should participate in all
Phase IlI activity.
#Steering Committee audits are required for these steps before proceeding.
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Phase IV.
Phase V.
Presentation to Steering Group (meeting with each Working
Group or Activity Chairman).
Preparation and presentation of the Steering Group's proposal
to the program manager.
2.7 SUPPORTING TECHNICAL DATA
The following supporting technical data will be provided in printed form, together
with adequate cross-references on the records of replies to the decision diagrams.
2.7.1 Maintenance Significant Items List
This list will include by System Designator, the name, quantity per Shuttle,
prime manufacturer part number, vendor name and part number for each item considered
by the Working Group/Activity to require individual analysis.
2.7.2 Significant Items Data
(a)(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Description of each significant item and its function(s).
Listing of its failure mode(s) and effects.
Expected failure rate.
Hidden functions.
Need to be on M.E.L.
Redundancy (may be unit, system or system management).
Potential indications of reduced failure resistance.
2.7.3 System Data
Description of each system and its function(s).
Listing of any failure modes and effects not considered
Hidden functions not considered in item data., :
in item data.
. ' . .
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APPENDIX 1
SHUTTLE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT CHARTS
.. . / ,.. . ,... . .
~~~~~~~~~~~~~! * ; '. ji 
_, ,".
p
!i ..
: . ..
I
.... t'.
.. . .
104--
I0 ... A L I 0 :000:W0W
Oul
w<c 0 -
at UJ n < 8 
w0. ~ n- Wm
I o< 40¢n
1-4-o e 
aa5
_ 0 :0 _ 
z- 
0 W
<a Ln
oW m a aW
LI 0- LI L
o In LI In
U W0W W .
L.zm4 .0
a U.
-- w ow
0 In W m 0
a In
z I-
0_ 0n . .
< In
..11 o _ u wd
>ozL~
8 w 
In4
<c < oac.
II LI ow: 4_ LI-., -LI., o. 
I
-
z
z: _
In in xI
0 Cw ° w
4- 2 
-- Z OVm
- z w
( Z z
_ ,,,z omc
.J
n. Z *LII
n 0InOI -
D-ww
IL I:LI_ 
>-
o~z
W z x
Z 00
Z i F Z
m
In In U 
Wl w 4
'0LnxLI
\
'I
.:\1
'\
"I
z
/
I
I
I
I
:II
I
I
o=
I
/
/
I
I
o
I t
A~~~~ mnzw
J .
i2I c ,
| < 'n 0 I 
I w ZC ZJ Io I: 9.. _ I
| a W  W
Ie > . W- m
In _<ILILI
ILl
z
0
0Qio
ILlCO
aa
I-
0
' U
Se
I
n2°
I,-
a:.0 :L
W. 1..1
I
IIIn
W
o
I
v<
oe
2. 
142
0 n
I-
I
0
I
0
o
0
z
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I :
.1.
I-
..n1.
I--
LUZ
CZ)
rE
.. I
CDCD
WCJ
L_
L.I
C.2a-c
LUIz
z
LJ
I--
Z
LL
-J
I--
I--
O0
:EmCD
Z
O
C,
I-
.=
CD, a)
3..
z
LU
co
In
In
4A
I-
z
U
"Il
w
U)
i'
4%
I.-
z
U) In M
u z
o0o0i-i
n 
M:)
0 .
ww
22
0
ooo
i
In u7
0o: O
o
S 01
I. LI.n
O 00
_ -,
U InS
aaw
w m' w
d b
r.-
a..)
I-
·
I-
I~
4 X
I
I
I
0 IL
°,. zu
n,< o n/ o..
I 0c In I W
w
11
zz
In
2wm
~,1
oS 
0: W
W >
.S
!
z0
I
,0
J,
-a 
u U.
l0o
o ' W 0'
U: "' I F 
nw D o moE
Io0
Q
A-]
I
1
i
-I
4
i
i
i
i
I.
i
i
, _
I
I
I
I
I
I__
Z
i: " 
SLI
D.
O
LLI
Z
_J
Z
w
I
La
r.'
0~
I,&
: .
Z
,C
Z
-II-
." 
I--
.--
GO..
I-
Z'
Ct
C.
Iq .
. ..
. .
N
I-
=,~
U-
IL
0
I-
W
F
w
CW
ww
I-J
IA
0
U.
0
Mc a
l..U)
==<
o -1-
_ _~
211o
o
ZJ0
0:0
. o
0
Z
ZOom
0
i
0
ZJ
-_:>o
40
Z A
W.4
../(
]Eb
0
UJ
Z
W
00
IU
-r
I-
0
w
0
U)
Z
ac
o
ro0
I0
I
-I-
20
40
z m
-4
! -
! -
Zw
<<(
40
I0
aCU
01c.
:1
< W,
W 
V>W
.m
0
4Z
tc)¢[Z
.J C
-Ia.0 W
I-- 0 0
-C -
- :u7tU0 Wm c L
Z
0
I
0
0.
IL
1-
m
0
1-
W
W
<. 
_,t
I-
--
W
IL
0I-
0
ZLL
40
IL
o ;Z
Z
-
I
I-
2s
"Z
44
O IL-
U,,0
4ww.
.0
° F
2
a
o0
w
m
I
I-
0
3-
W
W
W
ow
IL0F
-o,
O=
zw-
Ot c
-i
4j
4c
a
4A
W
0
0.
W
I-
I-
J 
Lz
_,,
C.
F 
IA.
0
w
UJ
ILw
W.4j c
w 
I,-
1a
1-
v)
o
=
O Lr
tr
*°-- Z
W) -
<J
ZI-
I-
WW
On.
0EO
WJ
W >UJ.J
zw
0<ow
UJ
W=
ILlW-
4w.-a:
)s>
-IOC
z Wrr<C
n ,.i,.
U)b2 cc
x oJ- o IC wz rc 
IC o zo ac:w IC ,.-W ><:w.-pD uOf o. u 0. Z ILl O Z~D rnoo (OH WP C Yi
A-2
I
p
0
1
m
i
I: i.
> .
OZ
o z
++ Z Z
2
wz
Z, >z
2m mt i x + 
A O CDW 
LAJ 0 L .)N3 LLaI -I
I-'
C-:
cc
w
CD
LL.
C-,
Z
V5
-J
-j
I-
C3
I--
c-,
Lu
zI
o
I
I
LU
-LJcn
z
2cLUI
I--
x
LUI
L
:
c,
I-
z
zL
I-
I-P
a D
0
Z i I 1
J Ul Z
coJ CY
l Z
U.0-LM
ZOU
" O
aP
o Q
LA
z
0zj
-z
ZW
>-UJ
o ,
Ul-
O 0>C
I--Z
,>- ,_U
JL 
O LUWO
O OZ
J Z·V
00
oe Z
C)
Z w
0=
2c LAJ
C: C=
_C-) -m
LLJC) 
-rI
O
3 Z
CU) ZC
- CI-
5· LL_
_Z
= .--
_L C= W
_ ' F
at V) w
C-
w
mLU
I-
.- I
z
Ac
LU
I-
x
LAU
L
LL
F- Z.< 
u. ° U
_co LUl
L iz E n U
:: >Z -.
- Ua O
UJ < 
JI-- :
^LU a- 0
Z W
I -- <
Z Ue
>U Z
I-- >_ CO I-
U. 0 a!:
Z~ >- o<_u
~: ,0
<_ X
Zwmw <
-vala!
'--- zu
WllU: <Z U
LeJvZ F U :.Z LL
< -U1 LJW
- U-z a!
ZU ZU t I J_ _ ._ 5 ~ Io
X__ z-~=_O=
C,
C,
LX
LU CDI- "C
z -
- C
1 ~-
0:: .
I l
_LL I-J
I-
CD LU
MLC
- -
C-,
J C
Ul
z
V,
U,
-J
z
w
o
:-
z
-J
z
Ln
S
lYI-
z
o
0
It
0
LU
z
O
I-:
U '
z
0·
. ..
0:
LD
I`
I
APPENDIX 2
DIRECT AND ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY
The following eleaborates on the term "direct and adverse effect on oper-
ating safety."
During the design process considerable attention is given to system
and component failure effect analysis to ensure that failures that result in
loss of function do not immediately jeopardize operating safety. In many
cases, redundancy can cause the consequences of a first failure to be
benign. In other cases, protective devices serve this purpose. Although
it may not be possible to continue to launch the Shuttle without correcting
the failure and although it may indeed be desirable to make an unscheduled
landing after failure, the failure cannot be considered to have an immediate
adverse effect upon operating safety. The inclusion of the word direct in
the phrase "direct adverse effect upon operating safety" means an effect
which results from a specific failure mode occurring by itself and not in
combination with other possible failure modes.
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APPENDIX 3
EXPLANATION OF HIDDEN FUNCTIONS
A component is considered to have a "hidden function" if either of the following
exists:
(a) The component has a function which is normally active whenever the system
is used, but there is no indication to the operations crew when that function ceases to perform.
(b) The component has a function which is normally inactive and there is no
prior indication to the operations crew that the function will not perform when called upon.
The demand for active performance will usually follow another failure and the demand may
be activated automatically'or manually.
Examples of components possessing hidden functions exist in a bleed air system.
A bleed air temperature controller normally controls the bleed air temperature to a maximum
of 400°F. In addition, there is a pylon shutoff valve which incorporates a secondary
temperature control, should the temperature exceed 4000 F. A duct overheat switch is
set to warn the flight crew of a temperature above 480°F, in which event they can shut
off the air supply from the engine by actuating the pylon shutoff valve switch. There is
no duct temperature indication.
The bleed air temperature controller has a hidden active function of controlling
the air temperature. Since there is a secondary temperature control in the pylon valve and
since there is no duct temperature indicator, the flight crew has no indication of when the
temperature control function ceases to be performed by the temperature controller. Also,
the flight crew has no indication prior to its being called into use that the secondary
temperature control function of the pylon valve will perform. Therefore, the pylon valve
has a hidden inactive function. For a similar reason, the duct overheat warning system
has a hidden inactive function. And the pylon valve has a hidden inactive function
(manual shutoff) since at no time in normal use does the flight crew have to manually close
the valve.
The hidden function definition includes reference to "no indications to the flight
crew" of performance of that function. If there are indications to the flight crew, the
function is evident (unhidden). However, to quafy as an evident function, these indica-
tions must be obvious to the flight crew during their normal duties, without special moni-
toring (bear in mind, however, that special monitoring is encouraged as a part of the
maintenance program to make hidden functions into evident ones).
It is recognized that, in the performance of their normal' duties, the flight crews
operate some systems full time, others once or twice per flight, and others less frequently.
All of these duties, providing they are done at some reasonable frequency, qualify as
C- 
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"normal." It means,' for example, that although an anti-icing system is not used every
flight it is used with sufficient frequency to qualify as a "normal" duty. Therefore,
the anti-icing system can be said to have an evident (unhidden) function from a flight
crew's standpoint. On the other hand, certain "emergency" operations which are done
at very infrequent periods (less than once per month) such as emergency gear extension,
fuel dump actuation, etc. cannot be considered to be sufficiently frequent to warrant
classification as evident (ur:hidden) functions.
Another example is the Apollo/Saturn SIV-B APS pneumatic regulators system.
A pair of series redundant regulators control the propellant ullage pressure at 196 +3
psia. The secondary regulator is set 4 psi above the primary regulator and also has a
tolerance band of +3 psi,which allows a potential 2 psi overlap. There is no pressure
transducer between the regulators and no position indicator on either. The only available
information is the ullage pressure measurement which cannot distinguish which regulator
is in operation because of the overlapping tolerance bands.
It is therefore possible to have an undetected failure of this primary regulator and
a liftoff on the backup system.
The analysis method requires that all hidden functions have some form of scheduled
maintenance applied to them. However, in those cases where it may be difficult to check
the operation of hidden functions, it is acceptable to assess the operating safety effects
of combined failures of the hidden function with a second failure which brings the hidden
function failure to the attention of the flight crew. In the event the combined failures do
not produce a direct adverse effect on operating safety, then the decision whether to
apply maintenance to check the pertinent hidden function becomes an economic decision
to be considered by Figure 3 (Chart A, Appendix 1).
Note also, in some cases, it is acceptable to accomplish hiddenfunction checks
of removable components during unscheduled shop visits, providing the component has at
least one other function which when failed is known to the flight crew and which causes
the unit to be sent to the shop. Also, the hidden function failure mode should have an
estimated reliability well in excess of the total reliabilityl of the other functions that are
evident to the flight crew. 
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